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I. INTRODUCTION
Cheryl Biddle had not paid her medical bills.2 Nor had she consented to have her
patient registration form released to anyone outside the hospital.3 What she did not
know was that the hospital agreed to send all patient registration forms to a law
firm.4 In turn, the firm attempted to collect any unpaid bills from the Social Security
1
The author would like to thank Judge Markus, Desiree Kies, and Joel Rathbone for their
thoughtful input and ideas concerning this Article. She would also like to thank her immediate
family and close friends for helping her through such a difficult time.
2

Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio 1999).

3

Id.

4

Id.
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Administration if they determined that the patient was eligible.5 The result: an
unauthorized disclosure by the hospital of confidential medical information, induced
by the law firm.6
Victims of unauthorized disclosures of medical information have enjoyed strict
protection by state and federal courts. This is because secrecy is considered a sacred
requirement in order to foster honesty and cooperation between a physician and
patient.7 Confidentiality is considered such a vital ingredient to the physician-patient
relationship by the medical profession that it is addressed in the oath, which is a
prerequisite to admittance into the field of medicine: “All that may come to my
knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily
commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will
never reveal.”8 The assurance of secrecy is, thus, ingrained in public policy and
medical ethics and not in the “archaic whims of the common law.”9 The importance
of this public policy and the confidentiality between physician and patient has
increased the growing concern in Ohio and throughout the nation regarding the
unauthorized release of medical information to third parties for approximately the
last thirty years.10
Recently, the state of Ohio has, once again, established itself as a leader in the
development of the law concerning unauthorized disclosures of medical
information.11 Ohio was first instrumental in developing this area of law when the

5

Id. At first, the hospital employees spent time determining which patients were eligible,
which was authorized by the patient because the employees were agents of the hospital.
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 396. However, eventually it was the law firm’s employees that
determined which patients were eligible. Id. This practice was unauthorized. Id.
6

Id. at 397. “To establish liability the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known of the existence of the physician-patient relationship, (2) the
defendant intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or the
defendant reasonably should have anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to
disclose such information, and (3) the defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician
could disclose that information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality
that the physician owed the patient.” Id. at 519.
7
Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidentiality: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426,
1438-39 (1982).
8

Oath of Hippocrates, in DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 609 (26th ed.
1981), cited in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1427 n.5. See also A.M.A. Principles of Med. Ethics
§ 9 (1957), reprinted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1750-51 (W. Reich ed., 1978); MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, EC 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, DR 4-401 (1980). See also CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS; Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (“The confidences should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when
imperatively required by the laws of the state” in determining the disclosure was actionable.).
9

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793; Robert A. Wade, The Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege:
Modified, Revised, and Defined, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1147 (1989) (explaining that the privilege
was not recognized initially by common law, and that state legislatures had to authorize the
privilege via statutes).
10

Vickery, supra note 7, at 1428-29.

11

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d 518.
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physician-patient privilege was initially recognized.12 Although courts have been
cognizant of the breach of confidentiality tort, few courts throughout the United
States have addressed the inducement aspect of the breach of patient confidentiality
by a third party.13 But now, in the boldest move since Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,14 the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure of medical information
has taken a new twist. Ohio is the first state to hold that a law firm can be
considered a third party and held liable for inducing a disclosure.15 In Biddle v.
Warren General Hospital, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a law firm who is
employed by the hospital is not considered an agent of the hospital and does not have
the same duty of confidentiality to the patient because the law firm’s duty is to the
hospital.16 Therefore, a law firm is a third party and can be held liable for inducing a
physician or hospital to make an unauthorized disclosure of medical information.17
Although some may argue that Biddle is the beginning of the end for the
physician-patient privilege and attorney-client privilege, this is not the case. This
Article will explore various ways to avoid the situation encountered in Biddle while
keeping the privilege intact. The development of the breach of confidentiality tort,
both throughout the nation and in Ohio, is examined in Part II. In Part III, the
closely related inducing a breach of confidentiality by a third party tort is analyzed
nationally and in Ohio. Part IV will provide an in-depth look at Biddle’s18 facts,
reasoning, and failed arguments, as well as possible solutions for hospitals,
physicians, and law firms who may encounter this situation today and in the future.

12

See Wade, supra note 9, at 1148. The first statute authorizing the privilege was created
in 1828. See N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 § 73 (1828). Ohio’s statute is OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.02(B) (West 1999), and the first Ohio Supreme Court case treating an unauthorized
disclosure was in 1928. See Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928).
13

Panko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1970); Alberts v. Devine, 479
N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Moses v.
McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1962); Morris v. Consolidated Coal, 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994); see also text
accompanying footnotes 134-63 infra.
14
Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793 (holding a third party liable for the inducement of
unauthorized disclosure of medical information).
15

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522-23.

16

Id. at 525-26.

17

Id. Because the issue was not addressed, it is still questionable as to whether the third
party is also liable to the hospital for the breach as well as the patient, or if the hospital should
be required to indemnify or contribute to the hospital’s portion of the liability. Id.
18

Id. at 518.
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II. BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY TORT
A. National Development
1. Theories of Liability
Although the physician-patient privilege has existed since 1828,19 courts did not
thoroughly examine the unauthorized disclosure of medical information until the
latter half of the twentieth century. State courts have altered the treatment of
unauthorized disclosures, through an evolution of various theories of liability, and
sometimes used multiple theories of recovery in their analyses.20 Although the other
theories of liability are still utilized, most states eventually recognized the breach of
confidentiality as its own tort.21
One of the first theories of liability for unauthorized disclosures to be widely
used is invasion of privacy.22 Plaintiffs often brought actions for invasion of privacy
when the focus of their case was more on the nature of the injury instead of the
fiduciary relationship.23 Many courts moved further away from the invasion of
privacy tort because the unauthorized disclosures were difficult to place into one
specific legal category of privacy law.24 Also, determining who should be legally
responsible for protecting a patient’s interests was also highly debated, because there
is no limit as to who can be held liable for a disclosure.25 Unlike the tort of the
19

N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 § 73 (1828). See also Wade, supra note 9, at 1148.

20

See, e.g., Dubin v. Wakuzawa, 970 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1998) (containing allegations that the
disclosure of plaintiff’s medical condition to a third party was based on breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of patient-physician relationship, defamation, unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress).
21

Some states still continue to deny patients the right to an action for breach of
confidentiality. However, they are in the minority. See Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F.
Supp. 1328, 1335 (D.D.C. 1978) (applying D.C. law); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322,
324 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (applying Georgia law); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn.
1965).
22
Privacy law is generally divided into four different areas. According to Prosser, these
are “intrusion upon seclusion,” “appropriation of name or likeness,” “publicity given to private
life,” and “publicity placing a person in false light.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
652B-652E (1977). In the past, courts have typically used the third category to honor cases of
the unauthorized release of medical information. Vickery, supra note 7, at 1426.
23

See Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (disclosing medical information to
patient’s employer); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961) (giving
banking information about depositor to employer); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977) (granting preliminary injunction against psychiatrist’s publication of patient
confidences), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1438-39.
24
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985). See also
Berger v. Sonneland 1 P.3d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding, under Washington statute, a
tort action exists; however, the court also concluded that the action was similar to an invasion
of privacy, allowing the plaintiff to recover damages, including emotional damages, for the
harm caused by defendant physician’s unauthorized disclosure).
25

Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530; Vickery, supra note 7, at 1439.
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unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, no higher duty is needed in
order to find liability for invasion of privacy.26 This difference is explained in
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, where a physician revealed the identity
of the birth mother to a daughter who had been given up for adoption.27 The court
held that the physician was liable for failing to keep a confidence under the breach of
confidentiality.28 Despite the fact that the issue was a privacy interest, the physician
was not liable because of an obligation under a general duty of people at large not to
invade one another’s privacy by prying into personal facts.29 Other requirements
limit a finding of invasion of privacy but do not limit the tort of unauthorized
disclosures;30 specifically, the information that is disclosed must be released to the
public at large and be “highly offensive,” whereas the tort of unauthorized
disclosures can arise regardless of the degree of offensiveness.31 Thus, the invasion
of privacy theory is less inclusive than the breach of confidentiality theory.32
A second theory on which courts base liability for disclosures is breach of
implied contract. Courts who use the breach of implied contract theory focus more
on the conduct of the parties involved instead of their relationship to each other.33
MacDonald v. Clinger considered this focus in a case regarding a psychiatrist who
disclosed “intimate details” about his patient to the patient’s wife.34 The New York
court held that a breach of implied contract would be inadequate because only certain
economic wrongs could be remedied using contract law.35 The court stated, “[i]f
plaintiff’s recovery were limited to an action for breach of contract … he would
generally be limited to economic loss flowing directly from the breach and would
26
Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530. See also Vickery, supra note 7, at 1439 (“The interests
present in confidentiality cases are (1) the expectation of confidentiality arising from the
assurance of secrecy and the reliance thereon; and (2) freedom from circulation of damaging
information. The first of the confidentiality interests is not protected at all by the privacy
action, and the second interest is protected only partially because of the doctrinal limitations of
the privacy action.”).
27

696 P.2d at 527.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 531.

30

“Not every secret concerns personal or private information…[s]ecrecy involves
intentional concealment…and secrecy hides far more than what is private.” Id. at 529
(criticizing the invasion of privacy right of action for a breach of confidence case).
31

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
1438-41.

OF

TORTS § 652D (1977), cited in Vickery, supra note 7, at

32
Various doctrines and requirements limit recovery under the invasion of privacy theory.
Id. at 1442. The Publicity requirement prevents liability unless the offensive disclosure is to
the public at large. Id. The Legitimate Public Interest doctrine prevents recovery if the
information disclosed has a legitimate public interest. Id. The Public Figure doctrine prevents
recovery if aspects of the person’s life is open to publicity because they are a public figure. Id.
33

Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1438.
34

84 A.D.2d 482, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 4 1982).

35

Id. at 486.
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thus be precluded from recovering for mental distress, loss of his employment and
the deterioration of his marriage.”36 The court was concerned with honoring physical
and mental loss that cannot be recovered from a breach of contract.37 However, the
court upheld an action for breach of confidentiality because a duty grew out of the
patient’s trust and confidence in his psychiatrist and the tort was “easily separable
from the mere breach of contract.”38 Therefore, the breach of implied contract theory
is inadequate because it does not provide for emotional and physical damages that
are common when unauthorized disclosures of medical information occur.39
Although not frequently alleged, a court can base liability on intentional
infliction of emotional distress.40 In order to sustain an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the conduct is required to be “so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,

36

Id. The court called the action a “breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality.” Id. at 482.
However, this is the equivalent to a breach of confidentiality because one of the requirements
of a breach of confidentiality is that a relationship must exist that gives rise to a physicianpatient privilege. Id.
37

MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 482.

38

Id. The court also explored an exception where public interest requires disclosure to
protect the threatened interest. Although the exception did not exist in this case, the court did
address that disclosure is permitted when there is danger to a patient, a spouse or another
person. Id. at 488; see also text accompanying footnote 60, infra, for further discussion of the
public interest exception.
39

MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 486.

40

Andrews v. Bruk, 220 A.D.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). Attorneys have also alleged
claims for disclosure based on negligent infliction of emotional distress; however, this theory
of liability is inapplicable because this arises when the plaintiff is a spectator of a traumatic
event caused by the defendant when a special relationship exists between the victim and the
plaintiff. Kniskern v. Somerford Twp., 678 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Lanza-Costlow
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 640 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Blackstone v. Lyden
Co., No. 94CA005886, 1995 WL 324112 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 1995); Midwestern Indemn.
Co. v. Craig, 665 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Fosnight v. Esquivel, 666 N.E.2d 273
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Boso v. Erie Ins. Co./Erie Ins. Exchange, 669 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995); Baker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 669 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Erie Ins. Group
v. Wolff, 640 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 545 N.E.2d 83
(Ohio 1989), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Dickerson v. Thompson, 624
N.E.2d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Courts are also reluctant to recognize negligent infliction
of emotional distress when only emotional distress damages existed. See Gracey v. Eaker, 747
So. 2d 475 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (failing to recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress without an accompanying physical injury). But see Berger, 1
P.3d 1187 (holding that a plaintiff seeking compensation for emotional damages resulting
from such an action need not meet the heightened standards designed to limit liability in cases
alleging bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress). In addition, claims have been
brought in the past for negligence solely; however, the courts usually treat negligence claims
using more specific bases of liability such as negligent training and supervision. See Doe v.
Community Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., Nos. 7342-97, 01-97-052157, 1999 WL 624551 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1999) (stating that a weakness of the negligence theory is that claims based
on an intentional act of disclosure are not covered under a negligence theory of liability).
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and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”41
The conduct of the disclosing party is often not considered ‘outrageous’ enough for
the plaintiff to recover under this theory.42 This was the case in Andrews v. Bruk
when a physician released medical records in his divorce proceedings detailing that
his patient had undergone a vasectomy in order to show that the patient and the
physician’s wife were having an affair.43 The court held that while the physician’s
actions were not condoned, they were not at a level that constituted extreme and
outrageous conduct.44 In contrast to the outrageous conduct required by intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the breach of confidentiality tort only requires a
disclosure, and outrageous or extreme conduct is not necessary.45
An additional theory of liability recognized by some courts is defamation. Courts
have limited liability for defamation cases regarding unauthorized disclosures of
medical information by requiring a specific injury in order to recover. For example,
in Bullion v. Gadaleto, a patient sued his psychologist for breach of confidence when
he revealed his patient’s sexual indiscretions and other confidences to the patient’s
wife.46 The court stated, “[d]efamation is chiefly concerned with injury to a person’s
reputation, and that specific injury must occur before a cause of action arises.”47 The
court ultimately held that the duty of confidentiality was more suitable because it
protects every injury that results from a disclosure, instead of only specific injuries
that are actionable under defamation.48
Courts have also addressed whether an unauthorized disclosure can fall under the
theory of medical malpractice.49 This reasoning is based on the argument that a
disclosure by a medical professional can constitute medical malpractice. In a case
from an Arkansas court, a patient brought an action for medical malpractice after the
patient’s nurse revealed to a third party that the patient either had AIDS or was being
tested for it.50 The court denied liability because the disclosure did not fall under the

41

Andrews, 220 A.D.2d at 376 (quoting Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d.).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. No action was brought for breach of confidentiality. If brought, the plaintiff most
likely would have won because the physician knew of the existence of the physician patient
relationship and disclosed the information to the court despite the fact that the patient had not
authorized the disclosure. Id.
45

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 523.

46

872 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Va. 1995).

47

Id. at 307. The plaintiff was suing under the theory of defamation because the statute of
limitations had passed for the breach of confidentiality tort. Id. at 304. If the statute of
limitations had not passed, recovery most likely would have been permitted because the court
recognized that emotional distress satisfies the damage element to a cause of action for breach
of confidentiality. Id. at 307.
48

Id. at 306.

49

See, e.g., Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 868 S.W.2d 505 (Ark. 1994).

50

Id. at 505.
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definition of a medical injury that was the result of a doctor’s treatment or order.51 In
addition, the court did not find it necessary to award liability under medical
malpractice, but instead found that disclosures should fall under the theory of
negligence because an unauthorized disclosure can be analyzed using everyday
experience and common knowledge of a lay person.52 The court held that only
“[w]here the matter requires the consideration of the professional skill and
knowledge of the practitioner of the medical facility, the more specialized theory of
medical malpractice applies.”53 Thus, the definitions of medical injury and medical
malpractice prevented an action under the theory of medical malpractice, and the tort
of breach of confidentiality would better apply to the disclosures by a nurse.
In addition, statutes in many states provide that a physician or hospital should not
disclose confidential patient information.54 However, these statutes do not always
clearly state that a patient has a resulting cause of action due to the disclosure.55
Plaintiffs have often turned to other theories of liability because a plaintiff cannot
receive compensation when no cause of action is stated in the statute. Another
concern is that many statutes only offer administrative disciplinary action as a
reprimand to those who have disclosed information without authorization instead of
a monetary form of compensation.56 The statutes that do provide compensation often
require that the specific relationship stated in the statute must exist and the defendant
must fall under the class specifically protected by the statute in order to receive
compensation.57 Due to the restrictions specified in each statute, the statutory cause
of action has often proved inadequate when compared to the breach of
confidentiality tort which is more easily applied.
The weaknesses present in the other theories of liability have increased the trend
toward recognizing unauthorized disclosure of medical information as an
independent tort in the past three decades.58 The elements of the breach of
51
Id. at 509. Here, the plaintiff was suing the hospital’s medical malpractice insurer,
presumably because the insurer was another deep pocket. Id. at 505.
52

Id. at 509.

53
Wyatt, 868 S.W.2d at 505 (citing Borrillo v. Beekman Downtown Hosp., 146 A.D.2d
734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
54

Vickery, supra note 7, at 1447.

55

Id. But see Berger, 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that a tort action existed under WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.70.030(1) for damages resulting from the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information related to health care and obtained within the physician-patient relationship).
56
ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.175(a), (c) (Michie 1981) (stating that failure of bank to maintain
confidentiality of bank records subjects it to disciplinary action); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509(9)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82) and Rules of the Board of Regents, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. VIII, § 29.1(b)(8) (1979) (providing together that a physician’s professional
misconduct includes breach of patient confidence), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7,
at 1447.
57
Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 802-03; Peterson, 367 P.2d at 286-87 (holding no implied
cause of action because no statute existed prohibiting bank disclosures); Doe, 93 Misc. 2d at
215-16, cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1447.
58
An additional theory of liability may be referred to as a breach of trust. However, the
courts that have treated this theory have done so in the same breath of their treatment with the
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confidentiality are (1) the existence of a doctor-patient relationship, and (2) a
disclosure of confidential information to a third party by a physician or medical
entity that was gained from the patient during the privileged relationship.59 There is
no prerequisite of a disclosure to the public at large or of specific types of damages
in order to sustain a cause of action for the unauthorized disclosure of medical
information to a third party. The breach of confidentiality tort offers a concrete
analysis applicable to a broad class of plaintiffs that courts have applied to various
factual scenarios with ease.
2. Defenses
However, defenses exist which restrict application of the breach of
confidentiality and protect defendants from a barrage of claims. A number of public
policy exceptions limit liability for disclosures, despite being unauthorized by the
patient.60 The common thread between all these limitations is that they are
breach of confidence or unauthorized disclosure and have not distinguished the two as being
different theories. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793.
59

Vickery, supra note 7, at 1442, 1455.

60

Various limitations include when danger to a patient, a patient’s spouse, or other person
exists: MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 482 (holding disclosure was not permitted because no danger
to a proximate individual was present); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958)
(permitting disclosure to patient’s fiance’s parents because a higher duty to give out
information existed); when the physical condition of the patient is an element to the claim:
Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984) (permitting disclosure when patient’s health is at
issue); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1962) (holding disclosure revealing a heart
condition was permitted because the physical condition was an element of the claim); if the
patient has a highly contagious or infectious disease: Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831
(Neb. 1920) (holding disclosure to those at risk of a contagious or infectious disease is not a
breach); in a general duty to warn case: Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976) (stating therapist’s duty was to “take whatever other steps are reasonably
necessary under the circumstances” to warn the potential victim and holding therapist liable
for his failure to warn a female student or her family when his patient had revealed to the
therapist that he was going to buy a gun and shoot the student); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield
Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997) (ruling outpatient setting still
constituted relationship that created a duty of the psychotherapist to protect against the
patient’s violent tendencies); if the physician is testifying during a judicial proceeding: Smith
v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917) (ruling that when taking the stand in a court proceeding,
a doctor will not be liable if the comments were relevant and the privilege is not abused); if the
duty is not recognized within the jurisdiction: Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C.
1996) (holding a pharmacist cannot be held liable to breach of confidentiality in South
Carolina because the duty of confidentiality of a pharmacist is not recognized); in First
Amendment and Public Right to Know situations: Vickery, supra note 7, at 1466 (noting
example of whether a candidate is physically fit for office); see also Hill, Defamation and
Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1291-99 (1976) (discussing
confidentiality and the First Amendment); if the disclosure is required for a medical peer
review process: Alar v. Mercy Mem’l Hosp., 529 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. App. 1995) (permitting
disclosure during peer medical record review because the duty of confidentiality is owed to the
patient by every doctor who is present at the review); when a medical malpractice claim is
brought by the patient against the physician: Rea v. Pardo, 132 A.D.2d 442 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (permitting disclosure if in reasonable anticipation of a malpractice claim being brought
by the patient); Moses, 549 A.2d at 950 (holding that patient waived confidentiality by filing a
malpractice claim); if a crime or fraud is disclosed: People v. Johnson, 125 Cal. Rptr. 725
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developed from various public policies that courts feel supercede the importance of
the confidentiality between a physician and patient. Therefore, an exception exists if
a court determines that a public policy concern, which permits or requires disclosure,
is more important than the patient’s right to keep medical information confidential.61
In addition to the various exceptions, other defenses are available for one who is
accused of an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information. One
defense that can be asserted is the statute of limitations has run and the claim is timebarred.62 The few courts that have treated this issue have reached varying results.63
For example, in Bullion v. Gadaleto, a psychologist raised the statute of limitations
defense after he revealed confidential information to his patient’s wife in an effort to
destroy their marriage and initiate his own sexual relationship with the wife.64 The
psychologist prevailed when he argued that the cause of action for breach of
confidentiality accrued when the disclosure occurred and not when the patient
himself was aware of the breach.65 Because the plaintiff had brought the claim under
the personal injury case of action, the defense argued that the personal injury twoyear statute of limitations applied.66 The court determined that “[a]n action accrues
when the essential elements of a cause of action are present.”67 As a result, a cause
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that right of confidentiality is lost where depositor attempted to
defraud bank); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d at 345 (N.J. 1962); State v. McCray, 551 P.2d
1376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing bank’s privilege to disclose depositor’s bad checks to
police on informal inquiry); see also Vickery, supra note 7, at 1464-65 (stating that special
caution must be used when acting only on reasonable suspicion); if authorized by a court
order: Hague, 181 A.2d at 345; Johnson, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (loss of right of confidentiality
where depositor attempted to defraud bank); McCray, 551 P.2d at 1376 (discussing bank’s
privilege to disclose depositor’s bad checks to police on informal inquiry); see also Vickery,
supra note 7, at 1464-65 (special caution must be used when acting only on reasonable
suspicion); but see Brandt v. Med. Defense Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) (holding that
ex parte communications are actionable only if they exceed the bounds of the waiver of the
privilege, but are otherwise permitted); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985)
(holding that ex parte interviews are permitted if proper channels are utilized and bad faith is
not used); but see Wade, supra note 9, at 1147 (stating a controversy exists as to whether the
disclosure is permitted ex parte).
61

Vickery, supra note 7, at 1466-68.

62

Ohio’s discovery rule arises when the plaintiff should have discovered the responsible
source of the disclosure or other action. 66 OH. JUR. 3D Limitations & Laches § 65 (1986).
Other states may determine the accrual date in a different manner. Id.
63

Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 303; Tighe v. Ginsberg, 146 A.D.2d 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).

64

872 F. Supp. at 304-05.

65

Id. at 306.

66

Id. Virginia’s personal injury statute of limitations period was two years. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992). Even though the court assumed that the breach of
confidentiality was a valid tort, because the cause of action accrued more than two years
before the suit was brought, the action was time-barred. Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 306.
67
Id. at 305. This is true even if the injury is very slight and becomes more substantial at a
later date. Id. at 306. The court also notes that the more intimate or embarrassing the
information is that is disclosed, the more damaging the disclosure and injury may be. Id. The
intent is to “discourage[s] any injury that might result from a physician’s unauthorized
disclosure of information.” Id. (emphasis added).
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of action for breach of confidentiality accrues when the first unauthorized disclosure
outside of the physician-patient privilege occurs, subject to the applicable statute of
limitations, and in Bullion, a two-year statute.68
Another case that explored the statute of limitations defense took a slightly
different approach.69 In Tighe v. Ginsberg, the patient was being examined for
hearing loss that he suspected was caused by conditions at work and the examining
physician sent a written report to the patient’s employer detailing his findings
without authorization.70 The court determined the three-year statute of limitations,
which pertained to general tort actions, was more appropriate than that of medical
malpractice.71 Here, the court found that since (1) the breach of duty did not occur
while “examining, diagnosing, treating, or caring” for the patient; and (2) no medical
expert was required to evaluate the evidence in the breach of duty cases as required
for medical malpractice, the action was a tort and should have a statute of limitations
that was analogous to a general tort instead of medical malpractice.72 The three-year
statute of limitations in Tighe is distinguishable from the two-year statute of
limitations in Bullion because the former is based on an action for negligence, while
the latter is based on an action for personal injury.73 Courts considering statute of
limitations issues in the future will most likely determine what time period to apply
by examining both the particular jurisdiction and the statutes of limitations from
analogous causes of action.
Another defense exists when the defendant receives explicit consent from the
plaintiff. However, the evidence must be absolutely clear that consent was obtained
in order to protect a physician from liability.74 In Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks
Brothers, the plaintiff brought suit against her plastic surgeon when he used ‘before’
and ‘after’ photographs of her cosmetic surgery at a presentation at a department
store, as well as a television program that promoted his practice.75 The physician
argued that he had obtained verbal consent to use her photographs in any lectures he
might give or in any other way that might help the patients.76 The court held that
only clear evidence of consent by the patient insulates a physician from liability.77
Therefore, the safest way for a physician to avoid liability for confidentiality is to
obtain written consent for disclosure for purposes that are absolutely clear. In
68

Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 307.

69

Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 268.

70

Id. at 269-70.

71

Id. at 272. Similar to Bullion, the action in Tighe was also brought under an action for
personal injury, but no specific statute of limitations existed for New York and they proceeded
under the general tort statute of limitations instead. Id.
72

Id. at 271-72.

73

Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 270, 272; Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 305.

74

Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985).

75

Id. at 584.

76

Id. at 586. The department store, Garfinckel’s, was not held liable because it was
justified in its reliance on the physician’s assurances that the patient consented. Id. at 590.
77

Id.
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Biddle, the hospital’s authorization form did not include any language referring to a
law firm and, consequently, the defense was not recognized.78
B. Development of Ohio Cases
An understanding of the history of Ohio’s law concerning breach of
confidentiality regarding medical information emphasizes the significance of the
decision in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital.79 Ohio courts have assumed a
leading role in strengthening patients’ rights regarding disclosures ever since breach
of confidentiality was first considered actionable in Ohio.80 However, it was not
until 1988 that the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that a physician could be held
liable for unauthorized disclosures of medical information.81 Still, it is the oft-cited
1965 decision of the Northern District of Ohio, interpreting Ohio law in Hammonds
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,82 that first fully examined the policy behind the
breach of confidentiality tort.83
78
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527. Specifically, the authorization form in Biddle stated
“[a]uthorization is hereby granted to release to my insurance company and/or third party
payor such information including medical records as may be necessary for the completion of
my hospitalization claims. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The Ohio Supreme Court did not
consider the law firm to be included in the language “third party payor.” Id.
79

Id. at 518.

80

Jones, 160 N.E. at 456.

81

Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449 n.19 (Ohio 1988).

82

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793. Although not the first decision to recognize the breach
of confidentiality tort, Hammonds has been cited by numerous other courts because of its
exploration of the public policy behind the physician-patient relationship and its reasoning for
holding the physician liable for breaches of confidentiality. See United States v. Willis, 737 F.
Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977);
Dickinson v. Magargal, No. 91-CV-4533, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13789 (D.N.J. Sept. 23,
1993); Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Howes v. United
States, 887 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1989); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335
(W.D. Mich. 1970); Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Hoesl v. United
States, 451 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Logan, 447 F. Supp. at 1328; McNerney v. Sec. of
HHS, No. 90-1689V, 1992 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 228 (Cl. Ct. May 5, 1992); Romine v.
Medicenters of America, Inc., 476 So. 2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Mull, 448 So. 2d at 952; Horne v.
Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); Duquette v.
Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Valencia v. Duval Corp., 645 P.2d 1262
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Heller v. Norcal Mut. Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1994); Murphy v.
Godwin, 303 A.2d 668 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 580; Humana Med.
Plan v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 435 So. 2d
262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996); Pearce v.
Ollie, 826 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1992); Baylaender v. Method, 594 N.E.2d 1317 (Ill. Ct. App.
1992); Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Kirk v. Financial Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 369 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Ahnert v. Wildman, 376 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1978); Geary v. Schroering, 979 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Leger v. Spurlock,
589 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Green v. Otenasek, 296 A.2d 597 (Md. 1972); Stevens v.
Barnhart, 412 A.2d 1292 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980); Sard v. Hardy, 367 A.2d 525 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1976), rev’d, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Hellman v. Board of Registration in
Med., 537 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. 1989); Schwartz v. Goldstein, 508 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. 1987);
Tower v. Hirschhorn, 492 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1986); Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 113; Hannaway v.
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In Hammonds, the court explained the intricacies of the physician-patient
relationship in order to justify holding an insurance company liable for inducing a
doctor’s intentional, unauthorized divulgence of confidences:84
Since the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery, he cannot sift the
circumstances of his life and habits to determine what is information
pertinent to his health. As a consequence, he must disclose all
information in his consultations with his doctor—even that which is
embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating. To promote full disclosure,
the medical profession extends the promise of secrecy referred to above.
The candor which this promise elicits is necessary to the effective pursuit
of health; there can be no reticence, no reservation, no reluctance when
patients discuss their problems with their doctors. But the disclosure is
certainly intended to be private. If a doctor should reveal any of these
confidences, he surely effects an invasion of the privacy of his patient.
We are of the opinion that the preservation of the patient’s privacy is no
mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as
well.85
Cole, 311 N.E.2d 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991);
Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Wenninger v.
Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 1976); Stubbs v. North Mem’l Med. Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Brandt v. Med. Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993); State ex
rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Callahan v. Burton, 487
P.2d 515 (Mont. 1971); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985); Runyon v. Smith, 730
A.2d 881 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Spaulding v. Hussain, 551 A.2d 1022 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1988); Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1995); Madden v. Creative Servs., 646
N.E.2d 780 (N.Y. 1995); Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 268; Rea, 132 A.D.2d at 442; MacDonald, 84
A.D.2d at 482; Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 582; Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 668; Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at
518; Littleton, 529 N.E.2d at 449; Orvets, 722 N.E.2d at 114; Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp.,
No. 96-T-5582, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998); Wargo v. Buck,
703 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Allinder v. Mount Carmel Health, No. 93 AP-156,
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 633 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1994); Honegger v. Saunders, No. 86
AP-118 Ohio App. LEXIS 3736 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 13, 1988); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs,
Nos. 86 AP 118, 86 AP 119, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1252 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1988);
Fletcher v. Bolz, 520 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d
370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Moore v. Grandview Hosp., No. CA 8808, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS
8571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Conti v. Lynn, 75 AP-591, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6329 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 20, 1976); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 226 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. App.
1967); Lambdin v. Leopard, 251 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1968); Bryson v. Tillinghast,
749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988); Humphers, 696 P.2d at 527; Humphers v. First Interstate Bank,
684 P.2d 581 (Or. App. 1984); Moses, 549 A.2d at 950; McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d
431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974); Morris, 446
S.E.2d at 648; Finn v. Schammel, 412 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Chase v. People’s
Drug Store, 24 V.I. 183 (1989).
83
The facts of Hammonds only included a claim for inducing disclosure instead of the
breach itself. 243 F. Supp. at 793. However, the court discusses the disclosure action at great
length and it often cited for its exploration of the physician’s breach of the patient’s
confidentiality and the liability that arises from that action. Id. at 795-802.
84

Id. at 801.

85

Id.
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The court further explained that it was the complimentary efforts of both “men of
medicine,” who encouraged complete honesty from their patients, and “men of law,”
who reinforced this encouragement by reassuring patients, that helped to create an
atmosphere of complete disclosure.86 These professionals fostered patient autonomy
by impressing on the patients that they themselves are the only individuals who can
waive their privilege.87
In Hammonds, the patient had brought an action against an insurance company
for inducing disclosure from a physician by informing him that his patient was
contemplating a malpractice suit against him.88 The court recognized the breach of
confidentiality tort and found that modern public policy and medical ethics requires
courts to enforce a physician’s implied assurance of secrecy.89 Despite the fact that
the court recognized that some exceptions permitting disclosure exist, the court felt
compelled to hold that any unauthorized disclosure of confidential information is
tortious conduct and effectively gives rise to an action for damages.90
An appellate court further expanded the claim for unauthorized disclosures of
medical information by holding a medical examiner liable for a disclosure under the
invasion of privacy theory, even when the traditional physician-patient relationship
did not exist.91 In Levias v. United Airlines, recovery was permitted from a doctor
who disclosed a flight attendant’s medical information to her supervisor as well as
her husband.92 Because the physician was a medical examiner for her employer and
not the patient’s personal physician, the typical physician-patient relationship was
not present.93 The court predicated recovery on whether the party receiving the
disclosure had a “real need to know, not mere curiosity” and whether the party had
authority to act on the disclosed information.94 The court suggested several factors
to consider in determining an invasion of privacy claim, including whether the party
86

Id. at 797.

87

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797.

88

Id. at 795.

89

Id. at 796-97. The court dismissed the defendants’ second argument that because no
malicious motive existed, liability could not be enforced. Id. at 798. The court ignored
persuasive authority (McPheeters v. Board of Med. Exam’rs, 284 P. 938 (Cal. 1930)), which
held that a malicious purpose was required to state a cause of action, and instead held that only
a purposeful divulgence of confidential information was needed to state a cause of action for
the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 798.
90

Id. at 802.

91

Levias, 500 N.E.2d at 370, 373. The court rejected an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress because it would require proving a serious and debilitating injury existed,
whereas proving invasion of privacy did not. Id. at 370, 374. Most actions for disclosure
were based on these bases of liability at this time. Id.
92

Id. at 370. The physician-patient relationship was favored over the marital relationship
because the husband also required a valid need to know the information in order to be the
recipient of privileged, unauthorized medical information. Id. at 370, 374.
93

Levias, 500 N.E.2d at 373. The patient was seeking a waiver of weight limits that were
imposed for appearance regulation that was applicable to being a flight attendant. Id.
94

Id. at 374.
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had any authority to act upon the data, whether the person’s own well being was at
issue, or whether emergency care was required and whether the physician has a
compelling reason to avoid seeking the patient’s permission before disclosing
information.95 Because the physician was held liable even though he was not the
patient’s regular doctor, Ohio law now recognizes liability that does not fall under
the category of the traditional physician-patient relationship.96
Another appellate court broadened the right to privacy action by honoring an
action for an unauthorized disclosure that was the result of a negligent act instead of
an intentional act.97 In Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, doctors sent a bill
with the patient’s diagnosis of Alcoholism to a stranger at her husband’s place of
employment.98 The court held, “[i]t seems to us that a negligent invasion of the right
of privacy… can just as effectively invade one’s right of privacy as an intention to do
so.”99 This ruling further strengthened patients’ rights to recover for unauthorized
disclosures by allowing recovery for an action under any mental state.100
Liability for unauthorized disclosures was, once again, extended when a court
permitted recovery to a minor patient for a disclosure by a physician’s agent.101 In
Hobbs v. Lopez, a nurse disclosed the minor’s pregnancy to her parents after she had
sought advice for an abortion.102 The court enforced liability of the doctors and the
corporation under the theory that the nurse was an agent; because the privilege has
the same purpose for an agent of a physician, the agent is bound by the same
obligation as the physician to keep the medical information in confidence.103 Also,
the court refused to distinguish the fact that it was the parents of the minor who
received the disclosure, implying that even parents are not privileged to receive
medical information if it is unauthorized and that the parents are not able to authorize
consent for their own child.104

95

Id. at 375.

96
Id. at 374 (stating the examination of the patient was involuntary because she did not go
to the physician attempting to seek medical care, but instead attended the examination in order
to obtain a waiver for her employment).
97

Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 484 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).

98

Id. at 266.

99

Id. at 268. Although the physicians were held liable, the hospital was not because the
physicians were not employees of the hospital. Id. at 267.
100

Id.

101

Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). The court based liability on
both breach of confidentiality and intentional infliction of emotional distress theories. Id.
However, the court would not enforce actions for invasion of privacy because the information
was not disseminated to the public at large. Id. Also, the court held the violation amounted to
conduct which held the defendants liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and,
therefore, did not predicate liability on negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
102

Id. at 1262.

103

Hobbs, 645 N.E.2d at 1263.

104

Id.
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Another protection offered for patients is the preclusion of obtaining only oral
authorization from the patient or other doctors instead of written permission by the
patient alone to release medical information.105 In Nationwide v. Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Jackson, an insured party gave authorization to an insurance company to
obtain copies of all medical records, but had refused to authorize interviews of
medical professionals and employers.106 The court held that, although a patient may
waive the privilege of confidentiality, the consent must be in express terms.107
Therefore, in order to properly guard patients’ privacy interests, each waiver
obtained must be explicit and unambiguous in its terms.
The Ohio Supreme Court also broadened patients’ rights by holding that the
judiciary is not permitted to create any public policy exceptions to allow disclosures,
but that the exceptions must be determined by the legislature instead.108 In State v.
Smorgala, a patient was charged with driving under the influence when the results of
her blood-alcohol test were released to a police officer after a car accident.109 The
court upheld a reversal of her conviction because the physician-patient privilege was
not subject to limitation by a judicially created public policy preference.110 The court
held, “[j]udicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative
enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.”111
Consequently, only the legislature can determine which unauthorized disclosures are
not actionable because a statutory exception precludes liability.112
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded liability by not only requiring a
medical professional to refrain from disclosing information, but by requiring an
actual affirmative duty to disclose when there is a potential of harm by the patient.113
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, the Ohio companion case
105

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 226 N.E.2d at 760.

106

Id. at 761. This is similar to Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 580, where a physician was held
liable for only obtaining oral consent to use before and after photographs of his patient’s
cosmetic surgery at a presentation in a department store. See text accompanying footnotes 7477 supra.
107

Id. at 762. The court stated, “[f]urthermore, even if there is some ambiguity due to the
fact that the contract says only ‘reports’ rather than ‘written reports,’ in general legal usage it
is accepted that medical reports means written medical reports.” Id. at 763.
108

State v. Smorgala, 553 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1990).

109

Id. at syllabus.

110

Id. at 674.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311. The development of the exceptions to
disclosure liability in Ohio originated in the first case treating the duty of confidentiality by
the Ohio Supreme Court. Jones, 160 N.E. at 456. In Jones, a widow brought a negligence suit
against a doctor who failed to notify the health authorities and others in dangerous proximity
to the patient as required by statute, that he was treating his patient with the extremely
contagious disease, black smallpox. Id. at 457. The court concluded that if a statute requires
disclosure, the duty of confidentiality is waived and the physician has an affirmative duty to
disclose the medical information. Id. at 456.
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to the Tarasoff114 case, involved a vocational counselor who was held liable for his
failure to prevent harm from occurring when a patient with a medical history of
schizophrenia fatally shot each member of his family.115 The court discussed the
statute providing that “no person shall be liable for any harm that results to any other
person as a result of failing to disclose any confidential information about the mental
health client or patient.”116 The court stated that despite the existence of the statute, a
special relationship exists between a psychotherapist and a patient that creates a duty
of the therapist to take affirmative steps to prevent any harm by the patient from
occurring.117 The affirmative duty may make physician liability appear to have no
boundaries in Ohio law, but many courts have found circumstances that limit legal
responsibility.
Although patients’ rights to recover for unauthorized disclosures have grown
stronger, some restrictions are still valid and may be used as defenses by the
disclosing party. One appellate court held that the dangerous risk of a contagious
disease may permit unauthorized disclosures of confidential medical information.118
In Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center Inc., a secretary of a medical center disclosed
to her son that one of the patients had been treated for a venereal disease when she
suspected her son had engaged in sexual relations with the patient.119 The court took
into consideration that the employee did not “chat at will,” but only revealed the
information out of fear of her son being exposed to a contagious disease.120 The
court held that this was a qualified or conditional privilege because “a commonality
of interest exists between the publisher and the recipient and the communication is of
a kind reasonably calculated to protect that interest.”121 If the defense can prove
against a high scrutiny that a common interest existed and that the disclosure did not
stretch beyond the interest, then the defendant might not be held liable.
Additionally, a physician’s ability to reveal confidential medical information
pursuant to a court order or statute has long been enforced.122 In State v. Antill, the
physician was required by statute to report an assault to law-enforcement officers
and to testify in court about the resulting wounds.123 The physician was not held
liable because the husband had used a deadly weapon and the statute required the
114

Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.

115

Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311.

116

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.34 (West 1999).

117

Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1327.

118

Knecht v. Vandalia Med. Ctr., Inc., 470 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). See also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243 (West 1999).
119
Knecht, 470 N.E.2d at 231 (holding a patient may only be able to sue under the theory
of invasion of privacy because an employee of a physician has no legal duty to refrain from
divulging confidential medical information concerning the patient of that physician).
120

Id. at 232.

121

Id. The court reasoned that the commonality of interest between a mother and a son is
obvious and her disclosure to her son was not actionable. Id.
122

State v. Antill, 197 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio 1964).

123

Id. at 552.
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physician to disclose the perpetrator of an assault when a deadly weapon is used.124
The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he publicity against which the privilege is
supposed to protect has already taken place…. The only purpose that sustaining the
privilege can now serve is to obstruct the course of justice.”125 If a statute or court
order not only permits, but also requires disclosure, the defendant will not be held
liable for the release of unauthorized confidential medical information.126
Ohio statutory law may also limit a defendant’s liability by permitting a
physician to reveal the results of a positive drug test, especially if the disclosure is to
another physician.127 In Neal v. Corning Glass Works Corp., an employee had
injured himself on the job and was taken to the emergency room for treatment where
blood and urine samples were taken and subsequently yielded a positive drug test,
which was then revealed to the physician hired by the employer.128 The court held
that the disclosure to another physician was not actionable because the second
physician owed the same fiduciary duty to the patient.129 Consequently, disclosures
between physicians are permitted and encouraged when they concern a public policy
and a common interest.130
The law regarding unauthorized disclosures has become more strict for medical
professionals since its inception. The holding in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital
that a hospital is liable for the release of patient registration forms to a law firm in an
attempt to collect medical bills is representative of the courts’ unwillingness to
permit an unauthorized disclosure to occur without legal responsibility.131 However,
124

Id.

125

Id. In addition, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 requires disclosure when the
circumstances in the statute are satisfied. Antill, 197 N.E.2d at 551. In fact, the physician
would incur liability if s/he did not disclose the medical information. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2921.22 (West 1999); Antill, 197 N.E.2d at 551.
126

Other statutes authorizing disclosure include OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West
1999) (determining when a physician may testify about privileged matters in court);
§ 3701.243 (regarding disclosure of information about HIV tests); § 5122.31 (determining
rights of patients who are hospitalized due to mental illness); § 2151.421 (statute requiring
practitioners of medicine to report knowledge or suspicion of child abuse or neglect).
127

Neal v. Corning Glass Works Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. Ohio 1989).

128

Id. at 1295.

129

Id. at 1297. In addition, the disclosure to the company doctor and the disclosure by the
employer’s doctor to the employer were also permitted under Knecht’s qualified privilege
because a positive drug test affects both of the physicians’ mutual interests. Id.; see Knecht,
470 N.E.2d at 230 (holding that a qualified or conditional privilege exists when a commonality
of interest exists between the publisher and recipient, and the communication reasonably
protects that interest); see also text accompanying footnotes 117-28 supra. The court stated in
dicta that the drug usage by the patient could constitute a disclosure necessary to protect the
welfare of the employees in the work environment. Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1297. Therefore, a
sufficient public policy probably would have permitted the disclosure. Id.
130
Id. Additionally, the court did not address the fact that the employer’s physician may
have had a conflicting duty toward the employer which may not give him the same fiduciary
duty toward the patient as the treating physician had. Id.
131

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518.
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in Biddle, it was not only the hospital, but also the law firm that was liable.132 The
law firm was held responsible for the inducement of the hospital’s breach of
confidentiality because the firm constituted a third party and was not considered an
agent of the hospital. 133 Biddle is the most extreme example to date of liability for
an unauthorized disclosure and the inducement of the disclosure.
III. THIRD PARTY INDUCEMENT OF THE BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The inducement of an unauthorized disclosure is a subset of the breach of
confidentiality tort. Although inducing a physician to breach the duty of
confidentiality is not an area that has been thoroughly explored, it is recognized that
“a person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is
himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby
caused.”134 It is well settled that the elements which must be satisfied in order to
establish liability for the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure are (1) the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of the physicianpatient relationship; (2) the defendant intended to induce the physician to disclose
information about the patient or the defendant reasonably should have anticipated
that his actions would induce the physician to disclose such information; and (3) the
defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that
information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality that the
physician owed the patient.135 Since its birth in 1965, only a handful of cases have
addressed the tort of the inducement of unauthorized disclosures.136
A. Development of Ohio Law
It was an Ohio court that first held a third party liable for inducing a breach of
confidentiality.137 In Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., an insurance
company induced a physician to reveal confidential medical information when a

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) (Violation of a Fiduciary Duty). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (Persons Acting in Concert). Other
types of fiduciary relationships that have been examined and treated similarly include
attorney/client, accountant/client, banker/customer, trustee/beneficiary, principal/agent,
director/corporation, law officer/informant, journalist/confidential source, parent/child,
broker/client, clergy/penitent, employer/employee, telecommunications assistant/hearing
impaired person, mediator/mediation participant, social worker/client, school guidance
counselor/student, and husband/wife. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 874, 876 (1977).
135

Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 648. Damages resulting from the breach itself and the inducing
of the breach may be measured differently because the fiduciary would also be liable for the
harm caused or profits made by the fiduciary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977)
(Violation of a Fiduciary Duty).
136

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793. See also Panko, 423 F.2d at 41; Neal, 745 F. Supp. at
1294; Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 113; Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 148; Moses, 549 A.2d at 950;
Alexander, 177 A.2d at 142; Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp., No. 129754, 129755, 1994 WL 1031299
(Va. Cir. Ct. May 15, 1994); Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 648.
137

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793.
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patient merely threatened to file a malpractice claim.138 When holding the insurance
company liable, the court analogized the policy behind other laws regarding third
party participation in breaches of trust to also apply to those who participate in or
induce the breach of a fiduciary duty.139 Specifically, the court held that parties who
are directly liable to a plaintiff are “third part[ies] who induce[] a breach of a
trustee’s duty of loyalty, or participate[] in such a breach, or knowingly accept[] any
benefit from such a breach….”140 The injustice invoked by inducing a breach of trust
explained in Hammonds became the basis underlying future court decisions when
holding parties liable for inducing an unauthorized disclosure.
Another Ohio district court further expanded the tort of the inducement of a
breach of confidentiality by holding an employer liable for inducing the disclosure of
medical information regarding its employee.141 In Neal v. Corning Glass Works
Corp., a patient brought an action against his employer for inducing his physician to
release the positive results of a drug test in breach of the physician’s duty of
confidentiality.142 The court held that an action for inducing the disclosure of
confidential medical information exists, but recognized that a question of fact
remained as to the employer’s role in ordering the drug test.143 The court
distinguished a disclosure between two doctors, wherein the fiduciary duty of
confidentiality is still owed to the patient by both physicians, from a disclosure
between an employer and doctor, wherein the fiduciary duty of the employer owed to
the employee is nonexistent.144 The Ohio courts’ bold step, by first holding a third
party liable for inducing an unauthorized disclosure, provided a stringent application
of patients’ highly protected rights of privacy.

138

Id. at 800.

139

Id. at 803. See also In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941) (stating that
one who knowingly joins a fiduciary in purchasing for profit the property of the trust estate in
unlawful circumstances becomes jointly and severally liable with him for resultant profits);
Shuster v. North American Mortg. Loan Co., 40 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio 1942) (holding that a third
person, who, although not a transferee of trust property, has notice that the trustee is
committing a breach of trust and participates therein, is liable for any loss caused by the
breach of trust); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (2d ed. 1959); Scott, Participation
in Breach of Trust, 38 TRUST BULL. 41 (1958).
140

Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 803.

141

Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1298.

142

Id.

143

Id. at 1298-99. The action for inducing a breach was not dismissed along with the
original breach of confidentiality action. Id. at 1299. Instead, the action for inducing the
breach remained at bar because the court reasoned that the claim for inducing a breach of
confidentiality was legally permitted. Id.
144
Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1299. This reasoning seems illogical that one can be held liable
for inducing a disclosure that wasn’t a violation of any relationship or duty. However, the
court held that the employer’s actions of inducing the disclosure of confidential medical
information might have violated the patient’s right to privacy. Id. Consequently, the
employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. Id.
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B. Development of National Cases
Other state courts have eventually followed Ohio’s example by recognizing the
inducement of an unauthorized disclosure as an independent tort and contributing to
the development of the law. In Alberts v. Devine, a minister’s superiors induced a
psychiatrist to disclose confidences during the minister’s evaluation for reappointment.145 The Massachusetts court broadened the application of inducement
liability by analogizing its holding with the general rule that a party is liable for
intentionally inducing another to commit any tortious acts.146 To avoid liability, the
court held that the superiors must prove they reasonably believed the psychiatrist
could disclose information without violating his duty of confidentiality.147 In order
for an inducement to be actionable, “[t]he inducement need not be a threat, nor a
promise of reward, but ‘may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral
pressure.’”148 With the exception of the Ohio courts’ interpretations, Alberts is one
of the few detailed expansions of the inducement tort.
Some state courts recognized that the tort of inducement of unauthorized medical
disclosures exists and should be punished, but could not hold a third party liable
because of another issue. In Alexander v. Knight, the defense’s doctor paid the
personal injury plaintiff’s doctor fifty dollars to provide a report of the plaintiff’s
condition without authorization.149 Although they did not consider the inducing of
the breach to be significant, the court held both the plaintiff’s doctor and the
defense’s doctor owed a duty to “refuse affirmative assistance to the patient’s
antagonist in litigation” and should be condemned.150 In addition, an insurance
investigator interviewed a physician without the express consent of the patient or a
court order in Anker v. Brodnitz.151 In an effort to reduce the improper pressures on
physicians to disclose unauthorized information, the court held liable any
participants in the private interviews of a physician during the investigation of an
insurance claim, for the disclosure or the inducement of the disclosure.152 In order to

145

479 N.E.2d at 116.

146

Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Ark. 1975) (negligence);
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (burglary and murder); Smith v.
Thompson, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (arson); Nelson v. Nason, 177 N.E.2d 887
(Mass. 1961) (negligence); Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345 (Md. 1966) (assault and battery);
Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (battery); Russell v. Marlboro Books, 183
N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (libel), cited collectively in Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 121.
147

Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 122.

148

Id. at 121 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. k (1979)). The court
reiterated the elements stated above that are required in order to hold a party liable for
inducing a breach of confidentiality by a psychiatrist. Id.
149

177 A.2d at 146.

150

Id.

151

98 Misc. 2d 148.

152

Id. at 153. In order to deter such private interviews, both the physician and the
insurance company would be held liable for disclosures that occurred during the private
meeting. Id. The court’s reasoning was that “the adequacy of formal discovery procedures,
the difficulty of determining what medical information is relevant, and the possibility of
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protect the patient’s right to keep his or her medical information confidential, some
New York courts require a ban on any private interviews of a physician while
investigating a claim.153 Also, in Morris v. Consolidated Coal Co., a patient on
worker’s compensation brought an action against his employer for inducing his
physician to disclose that the patient was lying about the extent of his injury.154 The
court held that “the concept of holding someone who induces a fiduciary to breach
his fiduciary relationship is not a foreign concept.”155 Each court’s recognition of the
tort of inducement of breach of confidentiality is yet another example of the high
standard placed on enforcement of patients’ rights.
However, various courts provided limitations to the independent tort of inducing
a breach of confidentiality. In Panko v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., a
store’s liability insurance investigators induced a physician to disclose a patient’s
medical history and injuries without her consent when she brought a slip and fall
action against a store.156 Despite the fact that the pre-trial disclosures were
actionable, the customer ultimately failed because she could not prove the
disclosures resulted in the loss of the personal injury action.157 The court held that
the “[p]laintiff must show a causal connection between the allegedly tortious conduct
and the injury complained of, even if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing an
intentional unprivileged interference.”158 The causal connection requirement
provided a limitation to disclosures that would otherwise be actionable.
Another limitation for the inducement tort is that the action for the original
breach of confidentiality must be successful in order for a third party to incur
liability for the inducement of the breach. In Moses v. McWilliams, a patient’s
doctor had disclosed confidential medical information about his patient to his
defense attorneys after the patient brought a medical malpractice action against him
for negligent care.159 The court ruled that because the patient had voluntarily
instituted a malpractice action against the doctor, the filing constituted a waiver of
doctors or insurers becoming the object of lawsuits for unauthorized disclosure require that
there be no private interviews without a patient’s express consent.” Id. at 154.
153
Id. at 153. The court hoped that the rule would reduce unnecessary lawsuits for
wrongful disclosure. Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 153.
154

446 S.E.2d 648, 650 (W. Va. 1944). Case was brought by certified questions and the
facts were not properly developed in the lower courts. Id. at 657-58.
155
Id. at 657. In addition to recognizing the elements for inducing a breach of
confidentiality stated above, the court added a fourth element that “the physician wrongfully
divulge[d] confidential information to the third party,” explicitly stating the holding in Moses,
549 A.2d at 950. Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 657.
156
423 F.2d at 42-43. The way that the insurers induced the physician to disclose the
information was by writing the physician and requesting that he fill out a medical report. Id.
at 42. The physician completed the form without obtaining authorization from the patient. Id.
The doctor was ultimately paid to testify as an expert witness against her. Id. at 42-43.
157

Id. at 44.

158

Panko, 423 F.2d at 44 n.4 (stating this is also true if the plaintiff’s cause of action is
viewed as one for inducing breach of a contract with an implied term of secrecy).
159

549 A.2d at 952. This claim was also brought against the medical center, but the
analysis is the same for both parties. Id.
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the patient’s privilege.160 The court then determined that because the original breach
of confidentiality was not actionable, all claims for inducing the physician to disclose
must also fail.161 These limitations help to provide some defendant protection against
unreasonable claims.162 But courts, on the whole, continue to remain overly cautious
of patients’ rights when third parties induce unauthorized disclosures of confidential
medical information.
Courts throughout Ohio have upheld the right of a patient to sue a third party for
inducing the unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information by a
physician. However, it was the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Biddle v. Warren
General Hospital authorizing an action for inducement of confidential medical
information by a third party that further advanced this claim.163
IV. BIDDLE v. WARREN GENERAL HOSPITAL164
The willingness of courts to protect patients’ rights to confidentiality is best
exemplified by the Ohio Supreme Court’s authorization of an independent tort for
the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure of medical information.165
A. Facts
The law firm of Elliott, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill Co., L.P.A. [hereinafter
“Elliott Heller”] approached Warren General Hospital [hereinafter “Warren
Hospital”] with the proposition that Elliott Heller could attempt to collect unpaid
medical bills through the assistance of the Social Security Administration.166 The
parties subsequently entered into an unwritten agreement whereby Warren Hospital
sent Elliott Heller patient registration forms to determine if the patients were eligible
for Supplemental Security Income.167 Elliott Heller then called the eligible patients
and if they consented, Elliott Heller assisted the patient by filing the claim with the

160

Id. at 953. The court stated an additional public policy to that stated in Anker, 98 Misc.
2d 148. Moses, 549 A.2d at 955. The court held, “[i]t is in the best interest that malpractice
claims be investigated at the earliest possible stage to determine their validity.” Id. (quoting
Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 197 (1963)). The court also based its ruling on the
Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege which permits disclosure in civil matters brought by
the patient for personal injury. Id.
161

Id. at 960.

162
Another example of a limitation concerns a case for tortious interference with contract.
Curtis, 1994 WL 1031299, at *1. In Curtis, an employee of the defendant Fairfax Hospital
brought an action for wrongful death of her infant. Id. However, the court found that there
was no valid contractual relationship and a breach could not occur if no relationship existed
that provided a fiduciary duty. Id., at *2. Therefore, a breach could not be induced when the
relationship was not a valid one. Id.
163

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 520.

167

Id.
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Social Security Administration.168 Under this agreement, Warren Hospital received
payments for medical services that otherwise would be written off, and Elliott Heller
was paid on a contingent basis for their efforts.169 The understanding between Elliott
Heller and Warren Hospital was that the hospital was the initial client of the law
firm, but the firm may “at some point in time” represent the patients individually
concerning Social Security benefits.170 The registration forms released by the
hospital included names, telephone numbers, ages, and medical conditions of each
patient.171
Initially, Warren Hospital had its own pre-screening process before sending files
to Elliott Heller.172 Shortly after the process began, Warren Hospital abandoned its
pre-screening process and released all its registration forms without obtaining
authorization.173 The registration forms174 traveled weekly via courier, and were
reviewed by attorney Robert Heller and his legal assistant, Sharyn Jacisin.175 If
patients were eligible for Supplemental Security Income, they received a phone call
from Jacisin or Heller’s secretary, Melanie Sutton.176 Jacisin and Sutton stated that
they were calling on behalf of the hospital, and informed the patients that they may
be eligible for help paying their medical bills.177 If patients expressed interest, they
were referred to Heller to receive further assistance.178 Heller claimed that he did not
tell the patients that Elliott Heller would be representing them.179 However, one
168

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.

169

Id. Heller got the idea for this plan at a legal seminar. Id. The agreement was an
unwritten agreement. Id. The process was in effect for a total of two and one-half years. Id.
170

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.

171

Id.

172

Appellants’ Warren Gen. Hosp.; Kevin Andrews; Elliott, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill,
Co., L.P.A.; and Robert L. Heller Merit Briefs; and Merit Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Cheryl A. Biddle, Individually and as Executrix; and Gary Ball, at 2, Biddle v. Warren Gen.
Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (No. 96-5582). Initially the hospital staff would separate
the self-pay accounts so the law firm could come in and review them. Id. However, this
would also not be enough to protect the parties from liability because the sorting did not
provide consent from the patient. Id. Liability would only be avoided if the hospital staff was
the initial caller to the patients and if the hospital obtained consent to send the registration
forms to the law firm. Id.
173

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.

174

This was disputed by patient affidavits. Id. at 520-21.

175

Id. at 520. Ineligible patients’ forms were placed in boxes for storage and no further
action was taken regarding these forms. Id.
176

Id.

177

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. Neither Jacisin & Sutton stated where they worked. Id.
Specifically, Jacisin and Sutton stated, “[y]ou might be entitled to Social Security benefits that
might help you pay your medical bill.” Id.
178

Id. Heller claimed that he did not tell the patients that Elliott Heller would be
representing them. Id. Instead, Heller said the patients retained Elliott Heller from their own
free will. Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.
179

Id.
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patient testified that even though she never retained Elliott Heller, the firm’s name
appeared in her letter from the Social Security Administration denying her
benefits.180 Although approximately one hundred phone calls were made,181 Heller
met with only five individuals, and only a couple of those patients were able to
recover any financial assistance from the Social Security Administration through this
process.182
The agreement between Elliott Heller and Warren Hospital was first disclosed on
WFMJ-TV in Youngstown.183 Sutton sent photocopies of patient registration forms
to the television station in retaliation of learning the firm was terminating her
employment.184 When the television investigation began, the relationship between
Elliott Heller and Warren Hospital ended.185 This class action for breach of patient
confidentiality and the inducement of the breach was filed less than a month later.186
B. Reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court
The analysis of Biddle includes similar explorations of law as the cases
previously cited. The court divided its treatment into five questions of law.187 First,
was whether a hospital could be liable for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information learned from the fiduciary relationship.188 In making the declaration, the
court drew support from Ohio’s lower court decisions that held a physician liable for
an unauthorized disclosure.189 The court wasted no time in acknowledging that a
physician or hospital could be held liable for unauthorized disclosures of patient
information.190

180

Id. at 521.

181

It is unknown how many phone calls Sutton made because she did not testify. See
Biddle, 1998 WL 156997, at *1, *13.
182
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. See also Appellants Robert L. Heller and Elliott, Heller,
Maas, Moro & Magill Co. L.P.A. Merit Brief at 4, Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d
518 (Ohio 1999) (No. 98-0952).
183

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 521.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id. Other causes of action were also alleged, but the court stated the breach of
confidentiality and inducement of the breach were the proper causes of action for unauthorized
disclosures of confidential medical information. Id. at 520. These include invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of implied contract,
and improper solicitation. Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.
187

Id. at 521.

188

Id. at 522.

189

Id. See also Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793; Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. &
Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1988); Prince, 484 N.E.2d at 265; Levias, 500 N.E.2d at
370; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 226 N.E.2d at 760.
190

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522.
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The second issue was whether breach of confidence in a physician-patient setting
could be recognized as an independent tort.191 The court stated that there were no
“serious” arguments against the recognition of breach of confidence as an
independent tort.192 In an effort to avoid stretching legal theories and ignoring
doctrinal limitations, the Ohio Supreme Court established that the unauthorized
disclosure of medical information to a third party was an independent tort.193
Support was also drawn from the nature of the physician-patient relationship itself
due to its underlying purpose of confidence and its fiduciary character.194
Third, the court had to determine if the hospital’s duty “to hold patient
information confidential [was] absolute.”195 The court held that the duty was not
because disclosures made pursuant to statutory mandate or common law duty have
been permitted in lower Ohio courts and other state courts.196 In these cases,
“disclosure [was] necessary to protect or further a countervailing interest which
outweighs the patient’s interest in confidentiality.”197 However, no special
circumstances permitting or requiring unauthorized disclosures existed that allowed
Warren Hospital to release the patient registration forms to Elliott Heller.198 The
agreement was merely an attempt to collect unpaid medical bills, and disclosures are
not prescribed by Ohio law for this purpose.199
The fourth issue was whether the hospital obtained clear patient consent of this
type of disclosure.200 Warren Hospital’s patient consent form for release of medical
191

Id.

192

Id.

193

Id. at 523. In addressing other theories of liability, the court held, “many…courts have
endeavored to fit a breach of confidence into a number of traditional or accepted legal
theories. Id. In much the same way as trying to fit a round peg into a square hole…these
theories prove ill-suited for the purpose, and their application contrived, as they are designed
to protect diverse interests that only coincidentally overlap that of preserving patient
confidentiality.” Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 523.
194

Id. The court cited the oft-quoted first state supreme court case exploring the issue of
unauthorized medical disclosures, Smith v. Driscoll, when it stated, “[f]or so palpable a wrong,
the law provides a remedy.” Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572, 572 (Wash. 1917), cited in Biddle,
715 N.E.2d at 522.
195

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.

196

Id. See, e.g., Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1324; Hague, 181 A.2d at 349; Berry,
331 P.2d at 817-18; Jones, 160 N.E. at 456; Simonsen, 177 N.W. at 832, cited collectively in
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.
197

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.

198

Id. Elliot Heller did have several arguments explaining that the information was never
disclosed outside of the privilege due to the attorney-client privilege between Elliot Heller and
Warren Hospital by showing how the privileged information stayed with in a “closed loop”
and that the law firm was an alter ego of the hospital. Id. at 524-27. In addition, the firm
argued that no extra information was released than would have been for the collection a debt.
Id. at 527. However, the court did not agree with any of the arguments. See text of § IV(C),
infra.
199

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.

200

Id. at 527.
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information stated that authorization was only granted to an “insurance company
and/or third party payor.”201 The court stated that consent forms must be “fairly
specific” as to who is authorized to have access to the patients’ confidential medical
information.202 Since the registration forms were sent to the law firm despite the fact
that the original consent did not permit the release to anyone except an insurance
company or third party payor, the court held the hospital liable for unauthorized
disclosure of the patient registration forms.203 The court urged medical professionals,
who wished to utilize this type of procedure, to obtain specific written consent for
each disclosure.204
Finally, the court recognized the tort of a third party inducement of an
unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information.205 The court held that
the intent was to protect the patient’s interest in obtaining medical care and limit
disclosure to those who have a “legitimate interest in the patient’s health.”206 In
addition, the court stated that each patient should be the controller of the patient’s
interests, and it was the patient’s right to determine who is to have access to
confidential medical information.207
After reiterating the elements for the
inducement of an unauthorized disclosure as previously held in other cases, the court
found that reasonable minds could conclude that the hospital breached its duty of
confidentiality and the law firm induced the breach.208
C. Failed Arguments
The Ohio Supreme Court entertained a number of arguments by the hospital and
law firm, which it determined to be inadequate for a variety of reasons. The first was
201
Id. It is implied that a general authorization does not provide enough protection for
patients’ rights to confidentiality. Id.
202

Id. The insinuation is that if the hospital had continued the pre-screening process,
explicit consent could be obtained by the patient giving authorization to the hospital to send
the records to the law firm. Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527. See discussion in § IV(D), infra.
203

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528.

204
Id. at 527-28. As shown by the harsh result in Biddle, it is also in the discloser’s best
interest to obtain specific consent in order to avoid liability. Id. at 529.
205

Id. at 528. The court stated that other forms of liability are not adequate due to the
various limitations previously examined. Id. at 529. However, the other theories may be
explored when the facts of the case fall outside the breach of confidence tort. Biddle, 715
N.E.2d at 529. In conclusion, the court stated, “it is the very awkwardness of the traditional
causes of action that justifies the recognition of the tort for breach of confidence in the first
place.” Id.
206

Id. The court still acknowledged that certain situations exist that justify disclosure. Id.

207

Id.

208

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528. The elements include “(1) the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known of the existence of the physician-patient relationship; (2) the defendant
intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or the defendant
reasonably should have anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to disclose
such information; and (3) the defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician could
disclose that information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality that the
physician owed the patient.” Id.
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an extension of the qualified privilege doctrine, which encourages the uninhibited
flow of information from a client to an attorney.209 The defendants argued that since
the attorney was also subject to a duty of confidentiality, the disclosure from Warren
Hospital to Elliott Heller was privileged – a “closed loop in which confidential or
privileged information goes from the patient to the hospital and then from the
hospital to its lawyers.”210 In support of this argument, the appellants’ cited Neal v.
Corning Glass Works Corp.,211 which held that a patient’s confidential medical
information could be disclosed to another physician because the duty to the patient is
the same for both physicians. However, the court rejected this argument because
“[t]he main thrust of these arguments is to focus our attention on the nature of the
relationship between attorney and client, rather than between physician and
patient.”212 The court distinguished Neal in its ruling because, unlike a physician that
owes a duty of confidentiality to the patient, the law firm instead owes a duty of
confidentiality to its client, the hospital, and no duty was directly owed to the
patient.213
Moreover, the court reasoned that each defendant was bound by a completely
different set of ethical regulations,214 and the law firm’s duty to its client does not
stem or depend on a confidential relationship that exists between its client and a
stranger.215 In Biddle, the client of the law firm is the hospital, and the client of the
hospital is the patient.216 Although this may appear to be a continual chain of
confidence, the duties of an attorney towards his or her client are different from that
of a doctor towards his or her patient. 217 The two relationships independently do not
create an attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the hospital
patients.218 Because Elliott Heller’s duty was to Warren Hospital, and not to any of
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Id. at 524-25.
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Id. at 525.
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Id. at 524-25, citing Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1294 (holding physician not held liable for
revealing patient’s positive drug test).
212

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525. The court foresaw even extreme examples avoiding
liability, such as “the individual medical practitioner who releases the bulk of his or her office
files without authorization so that a lawyer can search through them for potential workers’
compensation or personal injury claimants. Id.
213

Id. at 525-26.

214

Id. at 522. An extension of the court’s reasoning was that the law firm is bound by the
OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 and EC 4-1, which require an attorney to
hold the confidences and secrets of clients confidential. Id. at 525-26. The court concluded
that the law firm’s duty under DR 4-101 is to keep the confidences and secrets of its client, the
hospital, but not the patients of the hospital; therefore, the privilege of the doctor in Neal is
distinguishable. Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525-26.
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Id. at 526.
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Id. at 520.
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Id.
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the hospital’s patients, no “closed loop” allowed the disclosure to remain
privileged.219
A second argument addressed by the court was that the law firm was merely an
“alter ego” of the hospital because the law firm qualified as a third party through its
status as the hospital’s agent, and it could not be held to induce a breach of
confidentiality.220 The court held that the authorities, on which the appellants’ relied
for this theory did not apply to the facts at hand.221 First, the defendants relied on
Ohio Revised Code § 2317.021, which provides the definition of “client” within the
attorney-client relationship as being a person who communicates directly or through
an agent with an attorney. 222 The court felt that the attorney was the party who
communicated with the agent, and could not fulfill both the attorney and agent roles
simultaneously.223
In addition, the court thought the Uniform Health-Care
Information Act did not carry much weight for the “alter ego” theory because it was
not adopted in Ohio or in a majority of other states.224 Even if the “alter ego” theory
were applicable, it would not give free license to a principal to disclose confidential
information to the agent.225 Rather than give great deference to the alter-ego concept,
the court provided a strict interpretation of the Code in order to protect the rights of
patients.226
Another argument, which was only addressed in passing, was that the hospital
was merely taking action in good faith by collecting a bill that would otherwise have
been a write-off.227 While the court acknowledged that the law is not settled in Ohio,
it speculated that the only information that the hospital needed to disclose was
information that was clearly necessary to collect the debt.228 This argument was
weakened when a witness testified that if unpaid bills were the only matter at hand,
the only disclosures that would be required are the amount of the bill owed, any
219

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525.
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Id. at 525-26.

221

Id. at 526. The appellants’ relied on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.021 (West 1963)
and the Uniform Health-Care Information Act. Id.
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Id. at 526.
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Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526. The court stated, “a refusal to recognize a privilege in this
case will not sound the death knell of the attorney-client relationship. Id. By withholding a
privilege in this case, we do no more than recognize that there are some circumstances under
which a hospital can be held liable for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical
information to an attorney.” Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526. The court did not address the breach of the legal secretary
of law firm when the legal secretary disclosed the registration forms to the television station.
Id. at 521. This may be because it felt public policy would excuse her actions because she was
disclosing a wrong done to many people. Additionally, whether the hospital has a claim
against the law firm for contribution of its breach is also not discussed.
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Id. at 527 n.1.
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Id. (quoting Johnston, Breach of Medical Confidence in Ohio, 19 AKRON L. REV. 373,
391 (1986)).
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payment history, and any insurance information.229 The medical conditions of each
patient released in Biddle were more than was required to collect a bill and, as a
result, the court found that it was not crucial to treat this issue at that time.230
Because the issue was that confidential information not be disclosed, the court
thought that the fact that the law firm was trying to help patients with their medical
bills in good faith did not matter.231 In addition, the claim that the law firm acted in
good faith is placed in doubt because one of the law firm’s legal assistants knew
enough about the potential risk of liability that she copied numerous pages of the
patient registrations and sent them to the television station in order to retaliate
against her soon-to-be former employer.232 Therefore, creative lawyering through
the use of the “closed loop” theory, the “alter ego” theory, and the good faith
collection of an unpaid bill argument was not enough to distract the attention of the
Ohio Supreme Court from its main concern – protecting patients from unauthorized
disclosures of confidential medical information.
V. TREATMENT OF LAW POST-BIDDLE v. WARREN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Since Biddle’s recent decision, courts have begun to treat the analysis of the case
in a positive manner; Thompson v. Eiler demonstrates looser treatment.233 In
Thompson, a medical facility released records regarding carpal tunnel syndrome,
which also documented treatment for depression in order to process a workers’
compensation claim.234 In the course of her claim, the patient signed two separate
release forms.235 The First District Court of Appeals of Ohio cited Biddle when it
229

Id.
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Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527 n.1. The court stated, “[p]laced in its proper perspective,
such a privilege would also protect the individual medical practitioner who releases the bulk of
his or her office files without authorization so that a lawyer can search through them for
potential worker’s compensation or personal injury claimants.” Id. The court stated, “[t]he
hospital’s actions may, only in the broadest possible sense, be characterized as a collection
effort,” and but it is certainly not the kind of collection effort contemplated by those
authorities who would grant a privilege to collect an overdue debt.” Id.
231

Id. at 528. This is also supported by the Court’s statement that the particular need for
the information did not matter. Id. The Court stated, “the inducer’s need for the information
is irrelevant unless it is to advance or protect some interest giving rise to a privilege.” Biddle,
715 N.E.2d at 528. This holding is further supported by the federal Northern District of Ohio
court’s previous decision in Hammonds that no malicious motive was needed in order to be
liable for an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information. Hammonds, 243 F.
Supp. at 798.
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Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 521.
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Thompson v. Eiler, No. C-990634, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895 (Ohio Ct. App. June
30, 2000); Fair v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., No. 17942, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 56 (Ohio Ct.
App. January 14, 2000).
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Thompson, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895, at *4.
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Id., at *4-5. Specifically, the first form stated “READ CAREFULLY BEFORE
SIGNING *** By signing this application I expressly waive all provisions of law which
forbid any person, persons, or medical facility who heretofore did or who hereafter may
medically attend, treat, or examine me or who may have information of any kind which may
be used to render a decision in my claim, from disclosing such knowledge or information to
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recognized that an independent tort exists for the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential medical information, but did not hold the medical facility liable for the
disclosure.236 Because the patient had signed two appropriate consent forms and
filed a claim for workers’ compensation, the court held that the patient authorized the
release of the records that regarded her carpal tunnel syndrome.237 Moreover, the
facility was not liable for the disclosure of the depression records because a statute
required the Bureau of Worker’s Compensation to investigate and determine which
statements were appropriate for each claim.238 The court noted that it was the
claimant’s decision to run the risk of a potential disclosure by participating in the
state’s insurance fund.239 Thus, although the court based its ruling on the Biddle
decision, it applies a looser standard when filing a worker’s compensation claim.
Biddle was also cited as “new law” concerning unauthorized disclosures of
medical information in Fair v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, where the plaintiff sued
a Medical Center for failing to protect her when another psychiatric patient attacked
her in a community area.240 The patient argued that the alleged attacker’s
confidential medical records should be admitted at trial in order to establish that a
special relationship existed between the attacker and the medical center and to
determine that the medical center had breached a duty to control the attacker.241 The
court acknowledged Biddle’s “appropriate circumstance” exception where the rights
of an injured party supercede those of a patient and create a conditional or qualified
privilege to disclose.242 Disclosure was found to be the appropriate action because
the medical center had a duty to reasonably protect the plaintiff from assault or
battery by third persons, even if it was from another patient.243

the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, its agents or the Industrial Commission.” Id. In full,
the second note stated, “To Whom It May Concern: I agree to release my physician’s and or
hospital records to Michelman, Inc. for the purpose of my Worker’s Comp evaluation. Please
accept this fax as authorization for you to release only the records regarding my Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome to Michelman, Inc. and its representatives.” Id.
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Id. at *1.
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Thompson, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895, at *13. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02
permits the filing of a workers’ compensation claim to constitute a compulsory waiver of the
physician-patient privilege. Id. at *12.
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Id. at *14-15.
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Id. at *16.
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Fair, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 56, at *11. Interestingly, the court did not rely on Estates
of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311, in which a statute providing that no person is liable for any
harm that comes as a result of failing to disclose any confidential information about mental
health does not preclude a finding that a the psychotherapist has a special duty to take
affirmative steps to control a patient’s conduct.
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Id. at *7.
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Id. at *7, *9 (overruling Johnston v. Miami Valley Hosp., 572 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989)), which refused to create an exception to the physician-patient privilege to prove
the existence of a special relationship between a hospital and patient who caused injury to
another patient).
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Whether these cases, which take a much more lenient approach to patients right
than Biddle, are representative of a trend is yet to be seen. But it is apparent from
these two cases, in which, despite the strict nature of Biddle, it is still possible to
disclose pursuant to a statutory mandate or common law exception, including those
which are not specified in the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Pre-screening
The result in Biddle could have been avoided by minimal action on the part of the
hospital and the law firm. One possibility is that the hospital could have continued
its procedure of obtaining consent by using the hospital staff to call the patients that
were potentially eligible for Supplemental Security Income. The process of
informing the patients of the potential to have a portion of their medical bills paid
and providing the patients with the phone number of the law firm to receive more
information would give the law firm an opportunity to receive consent from the
patients directly.
B. Redaction
In a situation where only a part of a document contains confidential information,
another possible solution is to redact those areas that are confidential. This is
applicable to the physician-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, but the
act of redaction must be completed by the party who enjoys the privilege in order to
prevent the privileged information from being disclosed. Blocking out confidential
information and still preserving the document remains in the spirit of only disclosing
what is absolutely necessary in order to obtain payment for a bill or to accomplish
another goal.
C. Educate Other Fiduciaries
Another possible solution is to invoke seminars, performed by attorneys in order
to educate medical professionals about Biddle, its defenses, and the potential liability
that may arise from various disclosures. The attorneys can provide case studies, or
other examples, in an attempt to explain what a proper procedure is for disclosing
confidential information. In essence, it is practicing preventative medicine. These
seminars may be particularly important in states that do not follow the traditional
analyses regarding disclosure liability.
D. Staff Training
Often liability is incurred because an office staff person at a medical facility
breaks protocol or mistakenly sends extra confidential information than what is
actually authorized. Creating strict in-house procedures for staff members should
alleviate the temptation for any staff members to disclose information at the request
of the public. Requiring permission in order to send out patient information may
also avoid any close-calls in which a staff member might use mistaken judgment.
Also, training sessions, especially for beginners, that explain disclosure procedures
and the liability that can be incurred personally and on behalf of the facility may help
to prevent any unknowing disclosures.
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E. Consent/ Waiver
Finally, the best way to avoid liability is to receive explicit, written consent from
the patient. Perhaps the result of Biddle will be the use of patient waivers that are of
the length and detail of a car lease in order to ensure explicit consent. The specific
fact that a consent form was signed in Biddle occurs less frequently in other
situations because a consent form does not always exist. However, the impact of
Biddle’s holding is clearly important because the holding may also be applied to
cases where no consent form is involved.
What Warren Hospital and Elliott Heller should have done was to create a waiver
of liability that specifically named the law firm as a party authorized to receive
confidential medical information that was signed by each patient. The waiver may
provide insulation from liability, as it does for insurance companies and others today.
Guidance in drafting waiver forms can be found in other situations where waiver
forms have been utilized, and the legislature has been highly specific regarding what
information is mandatory in each waiver.244 The disclosure and inducing of the
disclosure can occur either if no consent form exists, or if the form is inadequate.
Having key phrases in larger and bolded font can increase the effectiveness of a
consent form or waiver. The important message to convey to the patient is that by
signing, patients are potentially waiving liability for disclosures or at least granting
authorization to confidential medical information for the specific purpose noted. The
more clearly a consent form portrays this message, the more likely the consent form
will be upheld.
VII. CONCLUSION
Biddle v. Warren General Hospital is the Ohio Supreme Court’s warning for
medical professionals and entities, as well as the third parties who relate with them,
to take notice of the strict analysis used for the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential medical information. It is a call to all those in the medical profession to
quickly examine and possibly alter their procedures for collection or other
disclosures. A major concern of those opposed to the holding of Biddle is that the
attorney-client privilege is headed for impending doom. However, the Ohio
Supreme Court reassured that this is not the case by stating that the “death knell” of
the attorney-client relationship will not be sounded by the court’s holding.245 The
court stated, “by withholding a privilege in this case, we do no more than recognize
that there are some circumstances under which a hospital can be held liable for the
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For example, in order to release records from a drug treatment program, the consent
form must “(1) [s]pecifically identif[y] the person, official, or entity to whom the information
is to be provided; (2) [d]escribe[] with reasonable specificity the record, records, or
information to be disclosed; and (3) [d]escribe[] with reasonable specificity the purposes of
the disclosure and the intended use of the disclosed information.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3793.13(B) (West 1999). Also, in order to obtain informed consent from a patient, the
consent is required to “set[] forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or
procedures, and what the procedures are expected to accomplish, together with the reasonably
known risks, and, except in emergency situations, set[] forth the names of the physicians who
shall perform the intended surgical procedures” in addition to acknowledging that the
disclosure has been made and any questions answered. § 2317.54(A) & (B).
245

Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526.
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unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information to an attorney.”246
Although a cry for help is being heard for those who fear that Biddle means endless
liability for the medical profession, the cases since Biddle’s decision have not made
this apparent. Therefore, let the overall lesson be learned - if adequate protection of
patient confidentiality is not maintained, no court will support the disclosure unless
the situation falls under one of the statutory or common law exceptions previously
mentioned.247 Fiduciaries may find themselves facing a holding similar to that of
Biddle: “We can find no interest, public or private, that would justify the recognition
of a privilege under these circumstances.”248
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Id.
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The exceptions include when danger to a patient, a patient’s spouse, or other person
exists; when the physical condition of the patient is an element of the claim; if the patient has a
highly contagious or infectious disease; or in a general duty to warn case; if the physician is
testifying during a judicial proceeding; if the duty is not recognized within that jurisdiction; in
First Amendment and Public Right to Know situations; if the disclosure is required for a
medical peer review process; when a medical malpractice claim is brought by the patient
against the physician; if a crime or a fraud is disclosed; or if authorized by a court order,
although a controversy exists as to whether this is permitted ex parte; disclosure to a potential
victim or their family that the victim’s life may be in danger because the patient wanted to kill
him or her. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.421, 2317.02, 2921.22, 3701.243, and 5122.31
(West 1999).
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